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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite their increasingly prominent role in American agriculture, 
genetically modified (GM) crops have received relatively little public 
attention in the United States.  In sharp contrast, use of biotechnology to 
genetically modify food ingredients has been the subject of mass debate and 
widespread resistance in the European Union (EU).1   
In response to public opposition based on uncertainty about potential 
health and environmental effects, the EU initially banned the growth and 
importation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) entirely.2  The 
United States, Canada, and Argentina attacked the de facto ban on GM crops, 
successfully challenging the moratorium at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).3  The WTO ruled that the moratorium violated trade agreements4 
and instructed the EU to implement procedures to promote the use and 
growth of GM crops.5  In recent years, a number of different regulatory 
schemes have been implemented in an attempt to reconcile the concerns of 
the population and food producers with those of the international trade 
community.6  
This Note argues that EU agricultural regulations should protect the 
interests of European farmers and consumers by preserving the option of a 
GM-free food market while allowing the segregated growth of GM crops for 
exportation and research.  Most importantly, an ideal system will also reserve 
regulatory power for a centralized EU authority; this centralization is critical 
to ensuring uniformity and accountability for food safety throughout member 
                                                                                                                   
 1 See Press Release, Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs [The European 
Consumers’ Organisation], Force-Feeding Never Works (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http:// 
www.beuc.org (follow “Press Room” hyperlink; then locate by press release date) (describing 
the EU reaction to a WTO panel decision which disfavors the EU position against GM foods). 
 2 The moratorium was officially notified by five EU member states in 1999.  Denmark, 
Greece, France, Italy, and Luxembourg informed the European Commission that they would 
take steps to have any new authorizations for growing and placing GMOs on the market 
suspended.  Minutes, 2194th Council Meeting (Environment) (June 24–25, 1999). 
 3 Justin Gillis & Paul Blustein, WTO Ruling Backs Biotech Crops, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/07/AR2006020701184. 
html. 
 4 Id. 
 5 For the conclusions and recommendations of the WTO Panel, see Panel Report, European 
Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293 (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/engl 
ish/tratop_e/dispu_e/291r_conc_e.pdf; Ian Sheldon, Food Principles: Regulating Genetically 
Modified Crops After the 2006 WTO Ruling, BROWN J. WORLD AFF., Fall 2007, at 121, 127–31.  
 6 See infra Part III.B. 
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states.7  Decentralization of authority could lead to dangerous inconsistencies 
in crop composition, regulation, and control, thereby undermining the ability 
of EU agencies to ensure that quality standards are met.  
The most important practical consideration in the GM food controversy is 
crop coexistence because cross-contamination is nearly inevitable when GM 
crops are grown near conventional or organic fields.8  Because of this 
agricultural reality, all European farmers and food suppliers—particularly 
those opposed to the presence of GM material in their products—have a 
vested interest in creating effective GM regulation. 
Political pressure from vocal EU member states led to a recent, 
groundbreaking development: in July 2010, the European Commission 
recommended new GM guidelines (Commission GM Guidelines).9  These 
new guidelines “mark a turning point in the European policy on gene 
technology.”10  However, to date the European Parliament and Council have 
not yet sanctioned the changes in EU law, which is required for the 
guidelines to take effect.11  If the Commission GM Guidelines are 
sanctioned, member states will be allowed to enforce their own regulations 
for GM crop coexistence and will be able to set up GM-free zones.12  Today, 
countries are only allowed to prohibit the cultivation of certain crops for 
health and environmental safety reasons.13 
                                                                                                                   
 7 See Stephen A. Ruckman, Regulations for Nutraceuticals and Functional Foods in 
Europe and the United Kingdom, in NUTRACEUTICAL AND FUNCTIONAL FOOD REGULATIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND AROUND THE WORLD 221, 224 (Debasis Bagchi ed., 2008) (“At the 
core of the EU is the concept of a single internal market.  In theory, at least, all products 
meeting EU requirements should be able to move freely throughout the union.”). 
 8 Crop coexistence refers to the practice of growing GM and non-GM crops in close 
proximity and the problem of non-GM crops becoming contaminated with genetically modified 
crop material.  Coexistence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic 
Agriculture, EUROPEAN COMM’N ON AGRIC. & RURAL DEV., http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/gmo/ 
coexistence/index_en.htm (last updated Mar. 7, 2012).  
 9 Commission Recommendation on Guidelines for the Development of National Co-
existence Measures to Avoid the Unintended Presence of GMOs in Conventional and Organic 
Crops, 2010 O.J. (C 200) 1 [hereinafter Commission GM Guidelines].  
 10 New Coexistence — Guidelines in the EU: Cultivation Bans Are Now Permitted, GMO 
SAFETY (July 27, 2010), http://www.gmo-safety.eu/news/1205.coexistence-guidelines-cultiva 
tion-bans-permitted.html [hereinafter New Coexistence]. 
 11 Id.  The EU’s standard decision-making procedure is known as codecision.  The directly 
elected European Parliament must approve EU legislation together with the European Council.  
Decision-Making in the European Union, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-informati 
on/decision-making/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).  Legislative approval of the 
Commission GM Guidelines is not expected to occur until at least 2012.  New Coexistence, 
supra note 10. 
 12 Commission GM Guidelines, supra note 9, Annex §§ 1.3–.4, 2.4. 
 13 Directive 2001/18, the current regulation governing GMO release into the environment, 
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This Note seeks to assess how proposed GM food regulations in Europe 
can be more effectively harmonized with the unique challenges of European 
farming practices and consumer culture, and does not take a position on the 
impact of integration of GM crops with non-GM crops on the global food 
supply or on the health of humanity as a whole.  This Note posits that the 
newly proposed system of member state-specific coexistence regulation will 
fail to address the need for compliance with EU trade agreements and more 
importantly will create inconsistencies in EU food regulation, potentially 
compromising the food safety and quality standards that are currently in 
place.  
This Note proposes a three-pronged solution: first, the creation of an 
empowered, centralized regulatory authority to govern GM crop policy in the 
EU; second, the repeal of existing exceptions that tolerate member state 
contravention for health or environmental reasons; third, the prevention of 
unintended crop contamination via creation of geographic zones across 
Europe that isolate the growth of GM crops.  These geographic zones must 
be regulated at the EU level to ensure that centralized trade regulations can 
continue to work in coordination with the crop containment measures, as 
well as to adequately protect growers whose fields are located near state 
borders and whom are therefore affected by the GM policies of neighboring 
states. 
Part II of this Note discusses the nexus of the GM farming controversy, 
which is the danger of conventional and organic crop contamination by 
neighboring GM fields.  This section discusses European attitudes toward 
GM food and describes how the challenge of coexistence is a particularly 
important factor in Europe, where farms are typically less than fifty acres in 
size and are tightly concentrated in certain regions.14  Part III analyzes the 
existing legal framework governing the controversial GM issues and 
discusses the EU agencies involved in food and agriculture regulation, 
focusing on those agencies specifically responsible for monitoring GM 
materials.    
                                                                                                                   
prevents member states from impeding the placement of GMOs on the market if the GMO 
otherwise complies with the Directive.  Directive 2001/18, of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 March 2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically 
Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 20/220/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1, 4, 
para. 56 [hereinafter Deliberate Release of Genetically Modified Organisms]. 
 14 European Union: Basic Information, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/in 
ternational-markets-trade/countries-regions/european-union/basic-information.aspx (last updated 
Jan. 4, 2010).  
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Part IV discusses conflicting preferences with regard to GM crop growth, 
focusing on the most controversial member states’ policies prior to the 
recommended Commission GM Guidelines.  Analysis of these member 
states’ approaches serves as a useful tool for predicting likely trends in 
member state policies moving forward.15  European Court of Justice cases 
also demonstrate the tension between member state sovereignty and the need 
for EU uniformity.16 
Part V proposes solutions that balance member state sovereignty with the 
need for uniformity.  Specifically, Part V advocates for creating geographic 
zones for GM containment while also enhancing EU regulations to ensure 
uncompromised central EU authority over GM matters.  In light of historic 
scandals regarding uniformity in food safety regulation, the EU cannot 
withstand another blow to its ability to regulate important matters of public 
policy.17  By the same token, it would be a disservice to European farmers 
and consumers if regulations were not put in place to reflect their passionate 
attitudes toward GM food.  If application of these regulations descends into 
chaos, a patchwork of farmers growing GM crops, especially those on the 
edge of the GM-free areas, could contaminate conventional and organic 
fields across Europe.  The result would be a continent of crops that European 
citizens themselves would not want to consume. 
II.  CHALLENGES OF CROP COEXISTENCE 
The European population’s opposition to the growth and consumption of 
GM food products has been strong, particularly compared to the relative 
silence on the issue in the United States.18  The thrust of the European 
argument against GMOs is that the field of modern biotechnology is still 
new, “and there are many potential unknowns associated with introducing 
                                                                                                                   
 15 See, e.g., Country Reports: GMOs in the EU Member States, GMO COMPASS (Mar. 23, 2007), 
http://www.biotec.or.th/biosafety/download/CountryReports_gmo.pdf [hereinafter Country 
Reports] (detailing Austrian, Dutch, German, and Greek opposition to GM crops); Seán Mac 
Connell, Growers’ Association Wants Ireland Declared GM-Free, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 28, 2010, at 4 
(detailing Irish farmers’ insistence that the government honor its pledge to declare Ireland a GM-
free zone).  
 16 See, e.g., Joined Cases T-366/03 and T-235/04, Land Oberösterreich & Republic of 
Austria v. Comm’n, ECR II-4005; Judgment upheld by the ECJ on Sept. 13, 2007 in Case C-
439/05P and C-454/05P, n.y.r. in the ECR. 
 17 See generally Keith Vincent, ‘Mad Cows’ and Eurocrats—Community Responses to the 
BSE Crisis, 10 EUR. L.J. 499 (2004) (discussing the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) 
crisis and noting that the scandal threatened the continued existence of EU food regulation). 
 18 Cinnamon Carlarne, From the USA with Love: Sharing Home-Grown Hormones, GMOs, 
and Clones with a Reluctant Europe, 37 ENVTL. L. 301, 313 (2007). 
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GMOs into both the human food chain and the natural environment.”19  
Some of the most significant “risks include the evolution of [GMOs] into 
‘super weeds,’ cross-pollination introducing herbicide resistance into 
existing weeds or introducing undesirable genetic traits into neighboring 
crops, and harm to nontarget populations caused by toxins introduced to 
create insect resistance.”20  Meanwhile, U.S. consumers remain largely 
unaware and unconcerned that approximately 75% of American processed 
foods contain some GM ingredients and are not labeled as such.21  
European farmers, consumers, and activists have a far more passionate 
attitude toward GM food.22  Some farmers are attracted to the economic 
benefit of GM crops; however, many others prefer non-GM crops on the 
bases of tradition and principle.23  Like the latter group, most European 
consumers value organic food produced by traditional means, and are 
suspicious of GM materials entering the food supply.24  Environmental 
activist groups, such as Greenpeace,25 are also vocal about their attitudes 
toward genetic modification.  
In addition to differences in food culture and attitudes toward GM crops, 
Europeans must grow GM crops in an agricultural system that is 
geographically different from that in the United States.  In 2007, the average 
farm in the EU was 46.2 acres while in the United States it was 418 acres.26  
The subsequent addition of twelve new member states to the European Union 
brought with it smaller farm sizes than the original members, resulting in a 
U.S. average farm size of more than twelve times that of the average EU 
                                                                                                                   
 19 Id.  
 20 Carl H. Nelson, Risk Perception, Behavior, and Consumer Response to Genetically 
Modified Organisms: Toward Understanding American and European Public Reaction, 44 
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1371, 1371 (2001). 
 21 Carlarne, supra note 18, at 313–14.  
 22 Nelson, supra note 20, at 1372 (describing how the regulatory regime is a reflection of 
consumer demand for protection from the potential dangers posed by GMOs). 
 23 DIAHANNA LYNCH, AND DAVID VOGEL, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE REGULATION  
OF GMOS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: A CASE STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN  
REGULATORY POLITICS (Apr. 5, 2001), available at http://www.cfr.org/genetically-modified-org 
anisms/regulation-gmos-europe-united-states-case-study-contemporary-european-regulatory-pol  
itics/p8688.  
 24 See Reimar von Alvensleben, Beliefs Associated with Food Production Methods, in 
FOOD, PEOPLE, AND SOCIETY: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE OF CONSUMERS’ FOOD CHOICES 381, 
394 (Lynn J. Frewer et al. eds., 2001) (noting that studies show GM product prices must be 
30% to 40% lower than competing non-GM products for European consumers to choose them 
over the organic or conventional alternatives).  
 25 Say No to Genetic Engineering, GREENPEACE, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/ 
campaigns/agriculture/problem/genetic-engineering/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).  
 26 European Union: Basic Information, supra note 14. 
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farm, which became 34.1 acres.27  Furthermore, farm sizes in the EU vary 
significantly by country, from an average farm size in the United Kingdom 
of 171 acres to Hungary’s average of 7.2 acres.28  It should be noted that 
“[a]griculture accounts for a nearly identical proportion of total economic 
activity in the United States and the EU,” however “the EU has more than 
three times as many farms.”29  Because the EU’s farm structure is 
characterized by a larger number of smaller farms, the choice of a single 
farmer to grow GM crops and the resulting risk of crop contamination to 
neighboring land can have a significant effect on many other growers in the 
region. 
Agricultural systems are generally described as one of three types: 
“conventional production systems, conventional production systems utilizing 
genetically engineered (GE) crops, and organic production systems.”30  GM 
systems “use crops that have been genetically engineered to resist pests or 
disease or to tolerate herbicides.”31  While the three types of farming systems 
can be utilized in the same geographic region, producers of conventional or 
organic crops typically want to avoid the contamination of their crops by GM 
materials.32  In the EU, where consumers are wary of GM crops, avoiding 
crop contamination is particularly important in preserving the European 
population’s ability to choose between GM and non-GM products for 
consumption. 
The European Commission defines the term coexistence as “the ability of 
farmers to make a practical choice between conventional, organic and GM-
crop production, in compliance with the legal obligations for labelling and/or 
purity standards.”33  In a practical sense, coexistence calls into question how 
                                                                                                                   
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Mary Anne Normile & Jason Price, The United States and the European Union—Statistical 
Overview, in U.S.-EU FOOD AND AGRICULTURE COMPARISONS 1, 3 (Econ. Research Serv., U.S. 
Dep’t Agric., Agriculture and Trade Report No. WRS-04-04, 2004), available at http://webarchi 
ves.cdlib.org/sw1s17tt5t/http://ers.usda.gov/publications/WRS0404/WRS0404b.pdf. 
 30 NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE DEP’TS OF AGRIC. & PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY, 
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AMONG GROWERS OF: GENETICALLY ENGINEERED, CONVENTIONAL, AND 
ORGANIC CROPS 7 (2006) (footnote omitted), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFil 
es/wwwpewtrustsorg/Summaries_-_reports_and_pubs/PIFB_Peaceful_Coexistence_Workshop_ 
Report.pdf.  
 31 Margaret Rosso Grossman, The Coexistence of GM and Other Crops in the European 
Union, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 324, 324 (2007). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Commission Recommendation 2003/556, on Guidelines for the Development of National 
Strategies and Best Practices to Ensure the Coexistence of Genetically Modified Crops with 
Conventional and Organic Farming, Annex, para. 3, 2003 O.J. (L 189) 36 (EC) [hereinafter 
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crops intended for different consumers—especially those who desire organic 
or non-GM food—can be grown in the same region as GM crops without one 
type of crop compromising the economic and social value of the other.34  The 
operative word is choice: farmers should be allowed to cultivate the crops of 
their choosing35 without interference from neighboring GM fields.36   
The issue of coexistence has created “significant controversy” in Europe 
in recent years.37  This controversy can be attributed, in part, to global 
cultivation of GM crops and resulting GM product availability because 
although a number of GMOs have been approved for processing or 
consumption in the EU, few have been approved for cultivation.38  Infrequent 
cultivation approval is most likely a consequence of the GMO approval 
process—until a seed variety is listed in the EU’s Common Catalogue of 
Varieties of Agricultural Plant Species,39 a variety cannot be sold and planted 
in any EU member state.40  
While EU policy encourages biotech development on its face, including 
that of GM crops, a complicated system of Directives and Regulations 
governing GM crop authorization has slowed the process of GM crop growth 
in the EU.41  For example, a lengthy moratorium on GM crop authorization 
spanning from 1998 through 2004 exacerbated an already slow approval 
process.42 
The issue of coexistence is extraordinarily controversial.43  Resolving this 
issue to all parties’ satisfaction depends on the EU’s ability to retain enough 
authority to effectively regulate the actions of European farmers.  Thus, 
choosing a capable organization to undertake this challenge is critical to 
                                                                                                                   
Recommendation on Guidelines for GM Development].  
 34 Grossman, supra note 31, at 325. 
 35 Id. 
 36 For a discussion of farming methods that allow farmers to cultivate conventional crops in 
coexistence with neighboring GM fields, see EUROPABIO, UNDERSTANDING COEXISTENCE 2 
(2006), available at http://www.scimac.org.uk/files/Understanding_CASE_Fact_File.pdf.  
 37 Grossman, supra note 31, at 325. 
 38 Id. at 326.  
 39 For the complete catalogue as of December 12, 2011, see Common Catalogue of 
Varieties of Agricultural Plan Species, 2011 O.J. (C 380 A) 1. 
 40 Council Directive 2002/53, on the Common Catalogue of Varieties of Agricultural Plant 
Species, 2002 O.J. (L 193) at 1.  
 41 Grossman, supra note 31, at 327. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See Cees Veerman, Dutch Minister of Agric., Nature & Food Quality, Speech at the EU 
Conference on Co-Existence of Genetically Modified, Conventional and Organic Crops: 
Freedom of Choice (Apr. 5, 2006) (transcript available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/even 
ts/vienna2006/presentations/veerman_en.pdf) (acknowledging the passionate debate regarding 
the challenges of coexistence). 
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ensuring regulatory uniformity and objectivity.  Policymakers seem to think 
that various member states should regulate coexistence to ensure that the 
varying “geographical, ecological and climatic conditions” that affect crop 
production will be duly considered.44  The wisdom of this preference is 
debatable if a uniform and effective system is the ultimate goal.  GM 
lawmaking at the member state level will likely reflect differing biases and 
priorities, undermining the prospect of an effective, uniform GM regulatory 
framework. 
The problem with decentralized regulation of GM crop growth lies in the 
nature of its most critical practical challenge: neighboring crop 
contamination.  The problem arises because of “adventitious presence,” 
defined as “unavoidable variability in seed, grain, and food”—a phenomenon 
considered natural before the advent of genetic modification.45  At issue is 
the fact that, in addition to genetically modified materials, adventitious 
presence can also be caused by naturally occurring elements such as weeds, 
seeds, dirt, and insect parts.46  Crops almost unavoidably include the 
adventitious presence of some foreign materials, often resulting from cross-
pollination from neighboring fields.47  While most farmers do their best to 
exclude such materials from their crops, a certain amount of contamination is 
unavoidable due to factors out of farmers’ control, like wind and insects.48  
GM crop development has brought this basic reality of farming to the 
forefront of the debate, as many European producers, consumers, and 
governments wish to avoid contamination.49 
                                                                                                                   
 44 Stavros Dimas, European Comm’r for the Environment, Speech at the EU Conference on 
Co-Existence of Genetically Modified, Conventional and Organic Crops: Freedom of Choice 
(Apr. 5, 2006) (transcript available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?referenc 
e=SPEECH/06/224&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en). 
 45 Serina Vandegrift & Christine Gould, Issues Surrounding the International Regulation of 
Adventitious Presence and Biotechnology, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 81, 83 (2003); see also What Is 
Adventitious Presence in Seed?, AM. SEED TRADE ASS’N, http://www.amseed.com/qaDetail. 
asp?id=52 (last visited Jan. 10, 2012) (“[Adventitious presence] refers to the unintended or 
unintentional presence of another seed variety or genetic material . . . as a result of natural, 
mechanical or human means. . . . For example, the detection of trace amounts of biotech 
material in traditional seed would be referred to as adventitious biotech presence.”).  
 46 GRAHAM BROOKES, PG ECON. LTD., CO-EXISTENCE OF GM AND NON GM CROPS 8 (2004), 
available at http://www.pgeconomics.co.uk/pdf/Coexistencekeyprinciplesdocument.pdf. 
 47 See EUROPABIO, supra note 36, at 5 (explaining that close proximity is usually required 
for cross pollination to occur). 
 48 Id. at 4 (citation omitted). 
 49 See generally CLAUDIO SOREGAROLI & JUSTUS WESSELER, MINIMUM DISTANCE 
REQUIREMENTS AND LIABILITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR CO-EXIStence, in 7 WAGENINGEN UR FRONTIS 
SERIES, ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TRANSGENIC CROPS 165 (J.H.H. Wesseler ed., 
2005), available at http://library.wur.nl/ojs/index.php/frontis/article/viewFile/922/495 (reviewing 
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Coexistence is described as having both horizontal and vertical 
elements.50  The relationship between conventional and organic crop farmers 
and those who cultivate GM crops is classified as “horizontal.”51  In other 
words, horizontal coexistence refers to farmer interaction at the same stage 
of the production and distribution chain, such as the planting or harvesting 
stages.  GM growers who neighbor conventional or organic fields often 
impose isolation distances, segregate crops, and notify nearby farmers of 
crop contents as methods of avoiding cross-contamination.52  Issues relating 
to seed content and quality—namely, GMO presence—are categorized as 
vertical coexistence issues because they involve every stage of the food 
production chain.53  Initial seed purity and potential GM contamination of 
organic or conventional seeds contribute to the overall level of GM material 
in food sold to consumers.54  
Scholars almost uniformly postulate that farmers have successfully 
managed coexistence all over the world, most often citing successful crop 
separation in the United States.55  This prevailing view fails to take into 
account the unique agricultural geography of EU member states, which 
renders U.S. success with crop isolation methods largely inapplicable in 
Europe.56  
In 2002, before the ban on GM crops was instituted, the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre (ECJRC) conducted an extensive study 
of GM crop cultivation, evaluating different scenarios for successful 
coexistence.57  The purposes of the ECJRC study included:  
                                                                                                                   
the problem that contamination presents for producers, consumers, and governments).  
 50 Leopold Girsch, Head of Business Area Agriculture, Austrian Agency for Health & Food 
Safety, Presentation, Conference on Co-Existence of Genetically Modified, Conventional and 
Organic Crops: Freedom of Choice (Apr. 5, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/events/vien 
na2006/presentations/girch.pdf.  
 51 Id. at 4. 
 52 Id. at 3. 
 53 Id. at 5. 
 54 Grossman, supra note 31, at 330. 
 55 BROOKES, supra note 46, at 3 (stating that GM crops have been, and continue to, co-exist 
successfully with conventional and organic crops in North America). 
 56 See Johanna Gibson, “Consumer Protection”: Consumer Strategies and the European 
Market in Genetically Modified Foods, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 176, 179 (2006) 
(noting that the small size of European farms “mak[es] the possibility that contamination can 
be contained by coexistence frameworks less plausible”). 
 57 ANNE-KATRIN BOCK ET AL., EUROPEAN COMM’N JOINT RESEARCH CTR., SCENARIOS FOR 
CO-EXISTENCE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED, CONVENTIONAL AND ORGANIC CROPS IN EUROPEAN 
AGRICULTURE (2002), available at ftp://ftp.jrc.es/pub/EURdoc/EURdoc/eur20394en.pdf.  
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●  Identifying sources and levels of adventitious presence of 
GM crops on non-GM farms; 
●  Assessing potential farming changes that may reduce 
adventitious presence of GM crops in conventional crops; 
and 
●  Estimating the costs of such changes, monitoring systems, 
and insurance against contamination for non-GM 
farmers.58  
Notably, the ECJRC study estimated costs for growers of non-GM crops 
rather than GM growers in order to accurately reflect “the present situation in 
which there is no particular legal obligation for commercial GM crop 
production to introduce measures to [minimize] adventitious presence of GM 
crops in non-GM crops.”59  The study found that the sources of adventitious 
presence included “seed impurities, spread of pollen and seeds from field to 
field by wind, insects and machines, overwintering of plants and plants 
growing from spread seeds as well as mixing of crops after harvest.”60   
ECJRC study findings are useful in illustrating the importance of 
geographic containment in preventing crop contamination.  The study found 
that in the regions in which 10% of crops were of a GM variety, the non-GM 
crops contained significant levels of GMO content.61  This result is 
significant because countries that have readily adopted GM crops typically 
contain 50% GM crops.62  While the study found that level of contamination 
in conventional crops could be maintained below threshold GM labeling 
levels (1.0%), to do this would require additional costs for precautions and 
monitoring, and would necessitate neighboring farm cooperation.63  Most 
significantly, the study found that because of the lower threshold of GM 
material permitted for organic crop production (0.1%), “organic production 
would not be feasible in a region with GM crop production.”64 
This Note does not address the issue of labeling and traceability of GM 
materials in depth; however, this issue plays a critical role in European crop 
                                                                                                                   
 58 Id. at iii. 
 59 Id. at 1, para. 7. 
 60 Id. at 2, para. 9.  
 61 Id. para. 10. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See id. paras. 12–14 (“Compliance with the 1% [labeling] threshold would result in 
additional costs (changing farming practices, monitoring system, insurance) of 1% – 9% of 
current product price for maize and potato.  For [oilseed rape] seed production, the equivalent 
costs to comply with a 0.3% [labeling] threshold would be 10% – 41% of current price.”). 
 64 Id. para. 13. 
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coexistence.65  For instance, most European growers want to keep the 
adventitious presence of GM material in conventional or organic crops below 
the threshold level that would require them to label their products as GM for 
a variety of reasons including consumer preference and regulatory 
compliance costs.66  
Coexistence of GM crops and non-GM crops, as explained above, is 
uniquely challenging in EU because of strong consumer preferences against 
it, as well as the small-scale agricultural geography of the region.  This 
challenge, although addressed by the European Commission and other 
agencies through a variety of regulatory schemes, remains unsettled.67 
III.  EU FOOD AND AGRICULTURE REGULATION 
A.  Food Law in the EU 
The fundamental characteristics of EU law and policy have implications 
for how agricultural regulations are enacted and can succeed. Each of the 
EU’s twenty-seven member states “relinquish some of their sovereignty to 
the EU institutions of the European Parliament, the European Commission 
and the Council of Ministers, who are responsible for proposing and 
adopting EU legislation.”68  While member states do retain their laws, they 
must adopt all European legislation.69  In circumstances where member state 
law conflicts with EU law, “EU law prevails.”70  
EU law is created in three ways.71  The first is the enactment of legislation 
“in the form of international treaties laying down basic policies, structures, 
procedures and powers.”72  The second is the enactment of “secondary 
legislation, in the form of regulations, directives and decisions.”73  The third 
                                                                                                                   
 65 Margaret Rosso Grossman, European Community Legislation for Traceability and 
Labeling of Genetically Modified Crops, Food, and Feed, in LABELING GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED FOOD 32 (Paul Weirich ed., 2007). 
 66 See generally Grossman, supra note 31, at 328–32 (describing the adventitious presence 
of GM crops and coexistence in the EU). 
 67 See, e.g., Recommendation on Guidelines for GM Development, supra note 33, para. 
2.1.8 (noting that there is no particular policy instrument that can be recommended for co-
existence, and that member states may prefer to explore the use of different policy 
instruments, e.g., voluntary agreements, soft-law approaches, and legislation). 
 68 Ruckman, supra note 7, at 224. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
2012] A HOUSE DIVIDED  539 
 
is development of case law “produced by the European Court of Justice to 
resolve disputes in interpretation and application of EU law,” which carries 
legislative force.74  Secondary legislation, particularly the Novel Foods 
Regulation75 and the Food Supplements Directive, has emerged as most 
relevant to the GM food debate.76  Timing provisions in regulations and 
directives are especially critical because “[r]egulations are directly applicable 
in all Member States from the date they enter force, [but] directives do not 
apply until implemented in national law.”77 
European member states are individually represented in the European 
Commission, which is composed of one independent member from each 
member state and is responsible for administering Parliamentary policies.78  
Within the European Commission, the Commissioner of Health and 
Consumer Protection and the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and 
Animal Health are the primary sources for the development of food safety 
measures.79  
In addition to representation on the European Commission, the 
overarching “principle of institutional autonomy” is an important part of the 
sovereignty of member states.80  This principle ensures that EU law does not 
dictate public sector organization of member states.81  Instead, the national 
legislature of each member state must create a food safety authority in order 
to meet the state’s obligation to comply with EU law.82  Most member states 
delegate this responsibility to a Minister of Agriculture, a Minister of Public 
Health, an independent food safety authority, or a combination thereof.83 
The modern landscape of EU food regulations were largely shaped by the 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis (BSE)—or “mad cow” disease—food crisis 
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in 1996.84  While the European Commission was involved in food regulation 
prior to the outbreak, its original focus was on “removing barriers to trade,” 
while “public health concerns played a minor role.”85  Only after the BSE 
crisis did food safety emerge as a pressing European community concern.86 
Investigations and resolutions in the aftermath of the crisis signified a “shift 
to an approach in which economic motives and agricultural policy concerns 
were no longer dominating issues of public health and consumer 
confidence.”87  
In his first speech to Parliament in October 1999, new European 
Commission President Romano Prodi announced that food safety, and thus 
consumer confidence in European food, was now a top priority.88  Prodi 
emphasized the importance of monitoring “[t]he entire food production chain 
‘from the plough to the plate,’” citing the need for “a single, coherent body 
of legislation.”89  Importantly, Prodi noted that “[i]n a single market [like the 
EU] . . . there must be equal protection for all citizens.”90 
Heeding Prodi’s call to action, in January 2000 the European Commission 
published its White Paper on Food Safety which included a proposal for an 
independent EU food agency.91  The Commission soon passed a regulation, 
known as the General Food Law (GFL),92 creating the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA), and a small team at the Directorate-General Public Health 
and Consumer Protection set up the Authority.93  
EFSA’s founding regulation states, “the free movement of food and feed 
within the Community can be achieved only if food and feed safety 
requirements do not differ significantly from Member State to Member 
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State.”94  Therefore, “[i]n order to ensure the safety of food, it is necessary to 
consider all aspects of the food production chain as a continuum . . . up to 
and including sale or supply of food to the consumer because each element 
may have a potential impact on food safety.”95  However, EFSA’s role in 
achieving such harmonization was expressly restricted by the regulation to 
“the provision of support on scientific matters,” requiring the agency to 
allow the European Community (EC) and member states to develop and 
implement “food safety standards and trade agreements.”96   
Despite EFSA’s limited mandate, the GFL became fundamental to most 
European food law after its passage in 2002.97  Article 17 of the GFL assigns 
responsibility for official controls and enforcement of food law to the 
member states, which includes the duty to monitor and ensure that food 
business operators are meeting food law requirements.98  Although the GFL 
delegates substantial authority to member states, other EU food regulations 
set certain standards for enforcement and supervision of the states, including 
requirements for official controls, laboratories, and accreditation.99  
B.  Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms 
European Community directives also govern the contained use of GMOs 
and their deliberate release.100  Directive 2001/18 concerns GMO traceability 
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and labeling requirements, including the release of GMOs themselves on the 
market or the release of products that contain GMOs.101  
Directive 2001/18 requires EU member states to record GM information 
in registers that include GMO release locations for the requisite field tests as 
well as a record of GM crops and products that have been approved and 
placed on the market.102  This requirement is meant to ensure that GMO 
locations are known to the public so that the potential environmental effects, 
including nearby crop contamination, can be monitored.103  
Under Directive 2001/18 the GMO approval process begins at the 
member state level with the state’s chosen authority—the Department of 
Agriculture, for example—receiving information about the GMO, including 
an environmental risk assessment.104  The process becomes multilateral and 
cooperative at the next stage; the state authority sends the information and its 
report to the European Commission and to other member state regulatory 
bodies who may object the GMO approval if they so choose.105  If all issues 
are resolved at this stage, the authority of the member state that compiled the 
initial GMO report must give written consent for the use of the GMO on the 
market.106  Consent is valid “for a maximum period of ten years,” but 
consent can be renewed.”107 
If a member state or the Commission maintains an objection to approval, 
the appropriate scientific committee must be consulted.108  If a scientific 
committee approves the GMO, the Commission then follows a regulatory 
procedure to give consent to placing the GMO on the market, first requiring 
approval from a committee made up of member state representatives.109  If 
the member state committee agrees with the scientific committee, the 
Commission grants consent.110  If the member state committee disagrees, the 
Commission works with Parliament and the Council to obtain consent.111  
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A safeguard clause in Directive 2001/18 protects member states’ 
discretion to restrict or prohibit cultivation of GMOs in their territories, even 
if the European Council and Parliament approve the GMO.112  This clause is 
central to the controversial actions of a number of member states who have 
attempted to ban GMOs within their borders.113  Under this clause, a state 
can restrict use or sale of a GMO if the state has new information showing 
that the GMO poses a risk to human health or the environment.114 
An additional member state loophole is found in Article 95(5) of the 
European Community Treaty.  This Article allows member states to 
introduce their own provisions even after adopting a Council or Commission 
approval measure “based on new scientific evidence relating to the 
protection of the environment . . . on grounds of a problem specific to that 
Member State arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure.”115 
In 2008, the European Commission set up the European Coexistence 
Bureau (ECoB)116 to “develop technical reference documents for best 
practices to achieve coexistence.”117  At the time of this writing, the ECoB 
has published a “best practices” report for maize crop production, and similar 
reports for other crops are expected to follow.118 
On July 13, 2010, the Commission issued a dramatic set of new 
guidelines for GM and conventional crop coexistence (Commission GM 
Guidelines).119  Before these guidelines were issued, the standard rules 
allowed GM-free zones only on the basis of voluntary agreements between 
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growers, or through exceptions to European Commission guidelines due to 
environmental risk assessment challenges.120  The Commission GM 
Guidelines drastically changed the definition of contamination.  Until 2010, a 
threshold value of 0.9% was regarded as the minimum amount for economic 
damage because breaching that threshold required labeling as GM 
material.121  In contrast, a showing of virtually any GM content can be 
regarded as an economic loss under the new guidelines.122  
Under the Commission GM Guidelines, member states are “obligated to 
regulate the cultivation of genetically modified plants through suitable 
specifications in such a way that different agricultural systems with or 
without gene technology can exist side by side in a sustainable manner.”123  
According to the Commission, the economic harm of GMO entry into the 
conventional crop system has gone beyond the damages of crop 
contamination.124  Growers and suppliers have also incurred significant 
production costs in separating GM from non-GM products.125   
The Commission GM Guidelines was also motivated by the 
aforementioned disparity in member state standards for GM regulation and 
planning.126  Importantly, the guidelines allow states to designate GM-free 
zones.127  Previously, regulatory GM cultivation bans had been repeatedly 
declared invalid by the European Court of Justice.128 
The Commission GM Guidelines issued in 2010 are the first step toward 
implementing changes to the European policy on gene technology announced 
in 2009.129  According to the Commission GM Guidelines, the necessary 
next step is to ensure that regulations for EU GM releases are modified so 
that approval of GM plants can be considered on grounds other than health 
and environmental risks.130  While the Commission calls for new 
considerations, it also voiced its concern that “[t]he centralised EU approval 
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system based on the scientific evaluation of health and environmental risks 
through the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) should be 
maintained.”131  Whether this scheme of centralized approval combined with 
decentralized enforcement enables effective regulation of GMOs remains to 
be seen. 
IV.  THE ESCALATING CONFLICT 
As described in Part II, EU member states enjoy a certain degree of 
leeway as they interpret regulation of GMOs, and if the Commission GM 
Guidelines are sanctioned member states will have even more discretion.  
Under the current regime, states may accept EU regulations with conditions 
and stipulations, and each member state assigns a national authority to 
monitor GMOs.132  Though GM crop cultivation is technically authorized 
throughout the EU, the extent of acceptance varies among member states and 
their populations.133   
Some states are vehemently opposed to genetic modification and 
biotechnology, while others are open to the potential opportunities for 
technological advancement and economic benefit.134  There are several states 
whose policies and actions illustrate some of the most important conflicts 
and potential solutions for the coexistence of GM, conventional, and organic 
crops.135  A discussion of the following member states also illustrates the 
most likely developments across the continent if the Commission GM 
Guidelines are sanctioned and integrated into national laws at the member 
state level.  States are likely to follow and expand upon their present course 
of action as the new guidelines take effect.  
The first example is Austria, where the public is “hostile to agricultural 
biotechnology.”136  Austrian regulations currently mirror the state’s popular 
opinion and ban several GMOs that were approved as safe at the European 
level.137  The national GMO ban has been challenged by the European 
Commission three times, and in a “stinging rebuff” to EU executive power, it 
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has consistently been upheld.138  At an EU vote on whether to force Vienna 
and Budapest to end their GM crop bans, at least twenty-one of the bloc’s 
twenty-seven member states voted against the measure, reaffirming the 
“sovereign right” of Austria and Hungary to prohibit GM cultivation.139  
Austria is now “the only remaining country cited in the World Trade 
Organization case filed against the European Commission by major GM crop 
growers Argentina, Canada and the United States that still applies bans on 
specific GM products.”140 
Because no GM crops are currently cultivated in Austria, coexistence 
regulations are unnecessary in practice.141  However most of Austria’s 
provinces have passed regulatory guidelines for coexistence.142  These 
guidelines, along with those of other EU member states, are useful in 
analyzing best practices, current innovation, and potential solutions for 
Europe as a whole.  
The Austrian Genetic Engineering Act stipulates that coexistence 
regulations must “safeguard organic and conventional farming methods.”143  
This overall goal is accomplished by state-level regulations, which generally 
utilize a set of common requirements, such as buffer zones between crops 
and information sharing among farmers.144  Austrian provincial regulations 
provide that “each farmer who wishes to cultivate GMOs is subject to an 
official (registration or authorisation) procedure,” in which “authorities may 
impose conditions for, or prohibit, cultivation.”145  Neighboring farmers are 
also named as parties to any registration or authorization procedure, to 
ensure that all affected parties are involved.146 
Under provincial regulations, conventional and organic farms in Austria 
are entitled to compensation for “significant adverse effects” that result from 
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GMO contamination.147  Such adverse effects can include a resulting 
inability to sell their harvest, or an inability to sell it as planned.148  
Injunctive relief is also available if a neighboring farmer is responsible for 
the harm.149  After a demand for compensation because of significant adverse 
effects caused by GMOs has been filed, the claim may only be rejected if the 
farmer using GMO crops is able to prove that his actions did not cause the 
contamination.150  This is effectively a guilty until proven innocent standard; 
however, parties must attempt to reach settlement through arbitration before 
any legal action can be taken.151  
Much like Austria, the German public is generally opposed to the 
cultivation of GM crops.152  However, many German politicians support 
biotechnology because of its potential contributions to national economic 
growth.153  Despite GMO economic potential, commercial production of GM 
maize in Germany did not begin until 2004 and in 2005 it accounted for a 
mere 0.1% of the country’s total maize production.154  The tension between 
the German government’s efforts to cautiously allow contained GM crop 
cultivation and resistance by some members of the militantly anti-GM 
environmentalist population provides a snapshot of the worst-case scenario 
for poorly implemented policies.  For example, a public register in Germany 
maps out the location of every farm cultivating GM crops, prompting some 
environmental activists to easily find and destroy the GM crops.155    
Germany has established a strict liability standard for GM material 
contamination, unlike Austria’s fault-based system, which is even more 
“likely to discourage German producers from planting GM crops.”156  
Farmers growing GM plants are liable for economic losses incurred by 
neighboring farms due to unwanted contamination regardless of whether or 
not a direct connection between their actions and the harm can be shown.157  
If a neighboring conventional or organic farmer discovers levels of GM 
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material that exceed the 0.9% labeling threshold, an “economic loss” 
exists.158  Liability attaches even if the GM farmer followed the codes of 
agricultural practices recommended by government regulation to prevent 
adventitious presence.159  
In another example, in 2004, the Netherlands became the first country in 
the EU to publish legal coexistence guidelines.160  The van Dijk committee, 
charged with authoring GMO regulations, brokered a cooperative agreement 
between conventional and organic farmers, seed producers, and chain 
organizations governing crop coexistence.161  The Dutch regulations that 
resulted were noticeably more amiable toward GM growers than those 
passed in Austria and Germany.  For instance, Dutch GM crop farmers must 
inform neighboring farmers of their plans to produce GM crops by January 
31 of each growing year.162  Any farmers who are planning to produce GM-
free crops must then inform neighboring GM farmers of their intent to do so 
within two weeks of that date.163  Specific codes of practice, including 
minimum segregation distances, must be followed by GM farmers to avoid 
mixing GM with non-GM crops.164  Minimum separation distances are in 
place for potatoes, sugar beet, and maize, and vary depending on whether a 
GM field neighbors a conventional or organic field.165 
In regard to crop contamination liability, farmers’ liability under Dutch 
law differs from both the Austrian fault standard and the German strict 
liability standard.  Dutch GMO growers are automatically exempt from 
claims of GMO-related economic losses, as long as the accused grower 
followed coexistence regulations.166  Farmers with neighbors who followed 
regulations but still caused contamination are compensated from a national 
fund, to which “[s]eed growers, breeders, farmers (including organic 
farmers) and processors all contribute.”167  
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In contrast, “Spain is arguably the most enthusiastic adopter of GM 
agriculture in the EU, allowing the cultivation of GM crops without a 
complete regulation regime.”168  In fact, GM maize has been commercially 
grown in Spain since 1998, when it became the first member state to allow 
GM cultivation.169  Coexistence rules have not yet been formally adopted, 
however, due to ongoing disputes between the Spanish Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Environment, which are each under pressure 
from divergent advocacy groups.170  Until regulations are adopted, growers 
must simply follow seed company guidelines together with some specific 
regulations, such as the Draft Royal Law on Coexistence.171  There are, 
however, “no compulsory training courses, no specific liability rules and 50-
[meter] isolation distances are standard.”172  Furthermore, while Spanish 
regulations do not currently enforce GM-free zones, “market forces have 
created region-by-region segregation” of GM crop cultivation in Spain.173  In 
highly productive Spanish regions, such as Aragon and Catalonia, between 
42% and 55% of corn grown is genetically modified.174  Meanwhile, other 
regions such as Asturias and the Basque Country have declared themselves 
GM-free.175 
The Spanish Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environment are 
attempting to enact regulations to better allow farmers to choose whether to 
produce organic, conventional or genetically modified crops.”176  
Regulations are in place with specific coexistence provisions that govern the 
cultivation of maize in Spain.177  
Like Spain, the UK government is not opposed to cultivating GM crops, 
but it has taken an initially cautious approach.178  The UK government policy 
on GM crops was set forth in a Parliamentary statement issued in March 
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2004.179  While the UK government has “concluded that there is no scientific 
case for a blanket ban on the cultivation of GM crops,” it maintains that 
“proposed uses need to be assessed for safety on a case-by-case basis,” and 
will “only agree to the commercial release of a GM crop if the evidence 
shows that it does not pose an unacceptable risk to human health and the 
environment.”180  Nonetheless, there has been no commercial cultivation of 
GM crops in the UK as of January 2010.181  
In 2006, the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA) issued a consultation paper on proposed coexistence policy for 
England, and received more than 11,000 responses from the public.182  The 
consultation paper proposed GM farmers should observe statutory crop 
separation distances to minimize GM cross-pollination and be required to 
notify neighboring farmers of their intention to cultivate a GM crop if land 
was within a specified distance.183  DEFRA’s consultation paper also sought 
views on 
whether special coexistence rules should apply in relation to 
organic production; options for maintaining the economic 
position of non-GM farmers if they have a crop with an 
unwanted GM presence above the EU 0.9% labelling threshold; 
the pros and cons of establishing a public register giving the 
precise location of all commercial GM crops; and possible 
guidance to farmers who may be interested in creating 
voluntary GM-free zones.184  
Most of the responses DEFRA received (approximately 80%) were 
printed forms or petitions from campaigns against the release of GM 
crops.185  For senders of the form letters, the principal concern was that the 
DEFRA proposals should not institute a 0.9% threshold for GMOs, but 
instead should attempt to prevent any GM presence whatsoever in 
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conventional and organic crops.186  The public responses that were not form 
letters either expressed a general opposition to GM crops (about 1,370 in 
total), or centered on the perceived threat to organic farming (about 390 in 
total).187  The UK has yet to publish official regulations on coexistence, but 
the UK has acknowledged the need to address GMO issues domestically in 
light of the EU GMO regulatory framework.188 
The aforementioned differences in member state GMO policies will likely 
be exacerbated if the July 2010 Commission GM Guidelines are 
sanctioned.189  Moreover, member states’ ability to create GM-free zones 
pursuant to Commission GM Guidelines may create unanticipated obstacles 
for the EU’s enforcement of food quality and safety standards, as well as for 
the EU’s capacity to provide adequate legal protections for farmers whose 
fields are contaminated by GM material from across State borders. 
V.  CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 
The July 2010 Commission GM Guidelines, if sanctioned, will be 
incorporated into member state laws as directives.  While it is difficult to 
predict the host of challenges that inevitably accompany such sweeping 
agricultural regulation, it is clear that certain problems will emerge in the 
coming months and years.  
As described in Part I, the coexistence of GM and conventional or organic 
crops is highly difficult and expensive.  Establishing GM-free zones is the 
most effective and realistic solution to the coexistence problem, and on this 
subject the 2010 guidelines are laudable.  However, the decentralization and 
delegation of authority to the member states to regulate the location of these 
zones could have adverse consequences that could be more effectively 
managed by a centralized EU government policy. 
Centralized and effective food safety regulations are particularly 
important because Europe has experienced several dramatic scandals due to 
the lack of uniformity, and it is critical that the EU not suffer another blow to 
its credibility or ability to regulate important issues of public policy.190  
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Additionally, the EU, as the trade authority for EU member states, must act 
in order to preserve its international standing, uphold its obligations, and 
assert its ability to bind member states.  Disrobing itself of the authority to 
regulate the coexistence of GM and conventional crops would be a definitive 
and disfavorable step toward minimizing the EU’s role in negotiating trade 
agreements with members of the seed, feed, and food communities 
worldwide.  
Furthermore, the EU must protect its member states’ citizens from the 
unintended consequences of irregular and decentralized food policy.  If food 
trade and safety controls remain regulated by the centralized EU government, 
but coexistence zone line-drawing is subject to member state authority, there 
could be disputes between growers in border regions. 
This issue presents a particular challenge for EU regulators, because crop 
contamination involves the influence of wind and other natural forces that 
carry GM materials over a considerable distance—not merely from one field 
to an adjacent field.191  States with large agricultural regions bordering those 
of other countries could encounter challenges if one state’s GM zone borders 
another state’s GM-free zone.  
The most significant challenge that will emerge from the decentralization 
of coexistence regulation will be the result of dissimilar legal protections for 
European farmers in the event of crop contamination.  As described in Part 
III, member states have varying approaches to liability for GM material 
contamination.  The dramatically different standards of loss, liability, and 
fault in member state tort systems may cause unnecessary conflict and lead 
to inequitable controversy resolutions. 
Parties to litigation for crop contamination could include neighboring 
farmers, other GM farmers in the area, seed producers and distributors, farm 
equipment providers, and licensing authorities.192  However, since tort law 
principles vary throughout Europe, different outcomes could result even in 
comparable fact settings.193 
For example, some member state legal systems distinguish between 
economic loss, which is a “mere consequence of preceding damage to the 
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person or to tangible property of the victim . . . and so-called ‘pure’ 
economic loss which affects the victim’s assets directly without any 
intermediary harm to her person or other property.”194  This distinction is 
critical to resolving cases of GM crop mixing.195  The distinction becomes 
outcome determinative in lawsuits because of consumer fear that the crops 
may be genetically modified, “even if no actual admixture had occurred.”196 
A farmer could be unable to sell his crops to his intended market because of 
this fear, even if the crop was not actually contaminated.  The distinction 
may also be relevant if a court treats GM material contamination as damage 
to a farmer’s crop sales, but not to his non-GM crops or his field.197  
Differing concepts of fault among member states will also dramatically 
affect the outcome of factually similar cases.  Jurisdictions that utilize 
traditional fault concepts will evaluate the defendant’s conduct, while those 
under a strict liability system will have no need to do so.  Austria, Germany, 
Poland and Switzerland are among those that have introduced special strict 
liability regimes, which apply specifically to crop coexistence problems.198  
These tort law principles will certainly have an effect on the manner of 
GM crop growth in member states, most likely by discouraging widespread 
GM cultivation in states with strict liability regimes.  However, it is 
important to remember that tort law is meant to compensate for past losses, 
rather than to safeguard against future harm.  For the benefit of food 
producers across the EU, harmonized rules on crop coexistence would assist 
all farmers’ efforts to avoid contamination damages, afford predictability and 
uniformity fostering economic growth and increased profits, and allow 
growers to cultivate GM crops without fear of unforeseeable contamination 
liability. 
The EU has a unique opportunity at this juncture.  An EU-commissioned 
study highlighted some of the most critical challenges of effective 
coexistence policy, and described the high cost of establishing effective 
containment areas and ensuring that food products are GM free from farm to 
fork.199  This knowledge could provide a basis for a continent-wide 
containment scheme in which GM crops are grown in easily-contained, 
isolated agricultural sectors.  
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The European population’s overwhelming preference for GM-free food 
should be respected and enforced by the EU government.  Keeping 
coexistence regulation in the hands of the individual member states generates 
vulnerabilities in the member states’ balance between responding to 
economic needs and consumers’ popular opinion.  If the decision of whether 
or not to allow GM crop planting is in the hands of the member states, global 
companies pursuing GM cultivation could “divide and conquer” the 
European market, entering and producing GM crops against the wishes of 
much of the populace.  Therefore, in order to respect European’s preference 
for GM-free food, regulation of coexistence should be maintained at the 
greater EU level.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The European Union has struggled over the past decade to develop an 
effective solution to the GM crop coexistence problem.  An ideal policy 
would enable the EU to maintain its standing in the world trade community, 
progress economically by growing GM crops for export to the ready world 
market, and simultaneously respect and incorporate the passionate opposition 
to GM foods of the EU populace.  
The EU should return to centralized regulation of GM crop policy by 
repealing the exceptions that tolerate member state contravention.  
Additionally, GM-free zones should be established across Europe in order to 
prevent unintended crop contamination.  These geographic zones must be 
regulated at the EU level to ensure that trade regulations can continue to 
work in harmony with crop containment measures and to adequately protect 
food suppliers that are central to the economic vitality of the European 
Community. 
